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## Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1949. No. 12, Original.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,

STATE OF LOUISIANA.

# MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S "MOTION FOR JUDGMENT."

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## Supreme Court of the United States

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No. 12, Original.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,

V.

STATE OF LOUISIANA.

# MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S "MOTION FOR JUDGMENT."

#### Statement.

On September 1, 1949, the State of Louisiana, Defendant, filed in the office of this Court a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on jurisdictional grounds; a Conditional Motion. to Dismiss for lack of indispensable parties; a further Conditional Motion for Bill of Particulars; and, in the alternative, a Motion for Extension of Time to file Answer or otherwise plead, that Motion making special reference to Rule 12 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure deferring the necessity for further answer until the Motions so filed shall have been acted upon by the Court.

Plaintiff has made no offer to meet the issues raised by these Motions, or to dispute the grounds upon which they are based. Instead, it has filed a Motion for Judgment and a Statement characterizing the first of the Motions filed by the State of Louisiana as being "of an insubstantial character, calculated to delay the adjudication of this case on the merits". But that Statement specifically mentioned only the Motion challenging the jurisdiction of this Court; the other serious Motions now pending being noticed only by the Statement's erroneous charge that the same Motion attempts "to raise other objections".

This memorandum is an answer to the Government's Motion, to point out reasons why it should be rejected, the principal one of which is the unprecedented request that judgment be rendered only on the Complaint, either with or without argument, in entire disregard of serious, undisputed defenses that are now pending.

## The False Accusation of Delay.

In its "Statement in Respect to Motion", plaintiff attempts to give the impression that Louisiana somehow already has wrongfully delayed the progress of this lawsuit, by filing documents between January and May, 1949. Plaintiff fails to state that, although it filed its motion for leave to file its complaint on December 21, 1948, it did not file its supporting brief until March 10, 1949, one month after defendant filed its previous document on February 9, 1949.

The charge that the State of Louisiana has engaged in "tactics" that are "contrary to the public interest" is unfounded and unjustified. It does not pretend to have the slightest basis in fact. On the contrary, Defendant has filed its Motion specially answering the allegations of the Complaint with the intention of having those Motions presented and decided by the Court in an orderly way. The State of Louisiana is ready and anxious to have those Motions fixed for oral argument.

### Louisiana Has Followed Fixed Procedure.

The State of Louisiana has acted in strict conformity with the requirements of the subpoena and the Order of this Court dated June 13, 1949, and with the rules establishing the procedure in Federal Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction.

The subpoena issued to Louisiana on May 17, 1949, "commanded" Louisiana to "be and appear before the Supreme Court, on or before September 1, 1949 \* \* \* to answer unto the complaint \* \* \* you are not to fail at your peril".

The Order of June 13, 1949, directed the State of Louisiana "to answer the allegations of the complaint within the time specified in the subpoena, otherwise the Plaintiff may proceed ex parte".

The language of that order is no different from the subpoena served on Louisiana, nor is it any different from the form or summons found in the appendix of forms (Form 1), in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted by this Court. That form also directs the defendant to "serve upon plaintiff's attorney... an answer to the Complaint" within a specified time, and concludes with a statement:

"If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint".

The form of the subpocna and order did no more than place the State of Louisiana in the position of any other defendant.

Rule 12 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

"" \* The Service of a motion permitted under this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court: (1) if the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within 10 days after notice of the court's action; (2) if the court grants a motion for a more definite statement the responsive pleading shall be served within 10 days after the service of the more definite statement."

Rule 12 (b) provides:

" \* \* that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, \* \* \* (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted."

## Rule 12 (e) provides that:

"If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within 10 days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just."

Louisiana has filed the very motions provided for in the above quoted Rules, which automatically defer the filing of serving of a responsive pleading, and plaintiff has failed to dispute the grounds upon which these motions are based, or to meet the issues presented by said motions, which justify the dismissal of its complaint. Yet plaintiff asks that this Court refuse to consider these defenses, properly pleaded on the mere assertion of its legal representatives that the defenses are "insubstantial":

# ◆A Demurrer or Motion is an Answer in Law to the Allegations of the Complaint According to the Age Old Rule.

This Court had occasion to adjudicate upon this very question over 100 years ago, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.

In New Jersey v. New York, (1831) 5 Peters 283, 291, the Court had entered the following order:

" • • it is further decreed and ordered, that unless the defendant, being served with a copy of this decree sixty days before the ensuing August term of this court, shall appear on the second day of the next January term thereof and answer the bill of the complainant, this court will proceed to hear the cause on the part of the complainant and to decree on the matter of the said bill." (Emphasis added)

Defendant, the State of New York, then filed a demurrer within the time specified. Plaintiff urged that New York had failed to appear and answer by the time fixed in the order, and that the case should be put on its merits.

Chief Justice Marshall, for the Court, rejected this contention and beld (6 Peters, 323, 327, in 1832) that a demurrer is an answer in law to a complaint, saying:

"The demurrer, then being admitted as containing an appearance by the State, the court is of opinion that it amounts to a compliance with the order at the last term. In that order the word 'answer' is not used in a technical sense, as an answer to the charges in the bill under oath; but an answer, in a more general sense, to the bill. A demurrer is un answer in law to the bill, though not in a technical sense, an answer according to the common language of practice. (Emphasis added)

The Court, therefore, direct the demurrer to be set down for argument on the first Monday of March of this term, according to the motion of the plaintiffs."

That decision, the rule of the Court, has been followed consistently in Federal and State Courts, eyer since.

Defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground of the Court's lack of jurisdiction of subject matter raises a question of jurisdiction hich must be met whenever raised. Ackerman v. Case Vo. D. C. Wis. 1947, 74 F. Supp. 639.

The absence of indepensable parties alone justifies granting defendants' motion o dismiss complaint for lack of jurisdiction. American Insurance Co. v. Bradley Mining Co., D. C. Cal. 1944, 57 F. Supp. 545.

In Bowles v. Glick Bros. Lbr. Co., 146 F. (2d) 566, followed in 146 F. (2d) 652, certiorari denied, 65 S. Ct. 1554,

325 U. S. 877, 89 L. Ed. 1994, rehearing denied, 66 S. Ct. 12, 326 U. S. 804, 90 L. Ed. 490, it was held that, if defendant needs additional information to enable him to answer or prepare for trial, the proper procedure is by motion for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars. (Rule 12 (b) (e))

And in Blanton v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., D. C. N. C. 1944, 4 F. R. D. 200, appeal dismissed 146 F. (2d) 725, it was held that when a motion for bill of particulars was made, the effect of it was automatically to extend the time for answering until after the motion was acted upon, making it unnecessary for defendant to accompany his motion for bill of particulars with a motion for further extension of time to answer. To same effect: Faske v. Radbill, (1947) F. R. D. 234.

Following are State cases holding, as above, that a demurrer or motion is an answer in law to the complaint:

Aker v. Coleman, 60 Idaho 118, 88 P. (2d) 869, 873. Davidson v. Graham, 25 Cal. App. 484, 144 P. 147, 148.

Lord v. Garland, 27 Cal. (2d) 840, 168 P. (2d) 5, 11. Evans v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. App. (2d) 743, 59 P. (2d), 159, 160.

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Oliphant v. Whitney, 34 Cal. 25, 27.

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Thomas v. Sterling Finance Co. (Mo. App.), 180 S. W. (2d) 788, 790.

Lyman v. Bechtel, 55 Iowa 437, 7 N. W. 673, 674. Stockham v. Knollenberg, 133 Md. 337, 105, A, 305,

307. Viles v. Green, 91 Wis. 217, 64 N. W. 856.

Howell v. Howell, 15 Wis. 55, 59.

Rider v. McElroy, 194 Ark. 1106, 110 S. W. (2d) 492, Willis v. Marks, 29 Or. 493, 45 P. 293, 294.

Esden v. May, 36 Nev. 611, 135 P. 1185, 1187.

Furthermore, the rule originally pronounced by the Court through Chief Justice Marshall in 1832, as the rule

for the original jurisdiction of this Court, has now been embodied by the Court in Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and, therefore, it is the same age-old rule which applies to Louisiana, as a defendant in this Court, as to all other defendants before the courts of the land.

The Court's order cannot be taken to mean, as is contended by plaintiff's legal representatives, that Louisiana has been deprived of her legal right to file answers in law, by demurrers or motions to dismiss the complaint, on the grounds (1) that the allegations of the complaint fail to show that this Court has jurisdiction over the defendant or, over the subject matter, and (2) that the allegations of the complaint fail to make the State's lessees who are indispensable parties, parties defendant, herein; and (3) that the allegations of the complaint are so vague, general and insufficient that defendant is unable properly to answer thereto, and that therefore a more definite statement should be made by plaintiff and particulars furnished by it, in the several respects pointed out in defendant's motion.

Boiled down, the contention of the Federal Government actually amounts to this, that this Court should discriminate against Louisiana and treat her differently from all other defendants, by precluding her from making the legal defenses which are available to all other defendants by demurrer or motion.

## The Defenses Raised by Demurrers or Motion Are Valid.

(1)

Is it an "insubstantial" defense for a defendant to question the jurisdiction of a court in which the defendant is sued?

The issue of jurisdiction has not been set at rest. The Order of this Court overruling the objections to Leave to File a Complaint did not in any sense hold or state that jurisdiction had been assumed over Louisiana as a party to this lawsuit. Indeed, it could not possibly have so held,

for at that time process had not issued and no attempt had been made to subject Louisiana to the effect of the Complaint that was allowed to be filed, or to the jurisdiction of this Court.

The uniform practice of this Court evidences that the jurisdictional question sas not foreclosed. Jurisdictional questions in particular usually have been disposed of in cogent opinions after the granting of motions for leave to file a complaint. Washington v. Northern Securities Company, 185 U. S. 254, Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1. In Louisiana v. Texas, jurisdictional questions were raised on Motion for Leave to File the Complaint and leave was nonetheless granted, as "of course". But subsequently Defendants demurred, and the case was then dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The jurisdictional objection is not a matter of indifferent consequence. The issue goes to the very vitals of the relations between the Federal Government and the State; and we do not believe this Court will treat it lightly nor decide for or against Louisiana without stating reasons for its decision, as plaintiff would now have it do.

(2)

Can it be said that Defendant offers an "insubstantial" defer se when moving for dismissal of a Complaint because of the lack of indispensable parties?

That traditional defense is one specifically provided for by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is one that is particularly important here when the Complaint asks for judgment against defendant State's lessees who have substartial property and logal rights placed at issue, without joining them as defendants.

(3)

Can it be said that a defense is "in betantial" when a defendant's Motion, which meets the strict language of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks an order requiring Plain-

tiff to file a Bill of Particulars and sets out in each and every detail in which the Complaint lacks that particularity and definiteness necessary to enable the defendant properly to file responsive pleadings! (See pages 25 and 29 of Defendant's Motion, filed Sept. 1, 1949).

#### Conclusion.

The defenses urged by the Motions do specially "answer the allegations of the Complaint".

The defenses are sound and undisputed, and when upheld by the Court will not delay the case—they will result in its entire dismissal.

And Defendant respectfully submits that there is no basis for the Motion for Judgment filed by the United States, as there is no juistification for this Court to ignore the defenses raised by demurrer and motion, and therefore, the Motion for Judgment should be denied and Defendant's Motions should be fixed for hearing.

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## Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1949.

No. 12, Original.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,

STATE OF LOUISIANA.

### ANSWER

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,

STATE OF LOUISIANA.

### ANSWER

Now comes the State of Louisiana, defendant herein, through its Attorney General, without abandoning but re-asserting, re-urging and reserving all rights under its Objections to The Filing of Complaint Herein, its Demurrer, or Motion to Dismiss on Jurisdictional Grounds, and its Conditional Motions; and without in any manner consenting to be sued, or submitting itself to the jurisdiction of this Court, answers said Complaint as follows, to-wit:

## FIRST DEFENSE

Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint of the United States of America for the reasons, (1) that the said Complaint fails to present a case or controversy under Article-III, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States or otherwise; (2) that this Court has no jurisdiction in equity herein; and (3)

that said Complaint fails to set forth a claim on which relief can be granted; all as hereinafter more particularly set forth, to-wit:

- (a) That according to Statement filed with said Complaint, the purpose of the United States of America in this litigation is "to establish the rights of the United States to the lands, minerals and other things underlying the Gulf of Mexico adjacent to the coast of Louisiana" and within the territorial limits of the State; the said Complaint asking that the rights of the United States of America be established and declared by this Court.
- (b) That the Complaint does not allege that Defendant has denied or denies, and Defendant does not deny but on the contrary admits, that the United States has paramount rights in, and full dominion and power over, the lands, minerals and other things underlying the Gulf of Mexico adjacent to the coast of Louisiana, to the extent of all governmental powers existing under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States.
- (c) That the relief prayed for and sought in and by the Complaint depends on the existence of conflicting claims of governmental powers to authorize the use of the bed of the Gulf of Mexico within the territorial limits of the State of Louisiana for the purpose

of searching for and producing oil and other natural resources.

- (d) That the Congress of the United States has not adopted nor is there now in force and effect any law of the United States asserting such Federal power or purporting to authorize the United States or any agency, lessee or licensee of the United States to search for and produce minerals and other things of value, including oil, in, on or under the bed of the Gulf of Mexico lying within the territorial limits of the State of Louisiana and particularly the area described in said Complaint.
- (e) That there are no conflicting claims of governmental powers to authorize the use of the bed of the Gulf of Mexico within the territorial limits of Louisiana for the purposes herein stated; that there is no actual justicable controversy between the United States and the State of Louisiana; this Court has no jurisdiction in equity herein; and the Complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

WHEREFORE, Defendant moves that upon consideration of said First Defense, it be sustained and that judgment be rendered in favor of the State of Louisiana and against the United States of America, dismissing the Complaint.

### SECOND DEFENSE

In answer to Articles I to VII, inclusive, of said Complaint, Defendant:

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Denies that this Court has jurisdiction over the State of Louisiana, as alleged in Article I of the Complaint.

### II.

Admits, that, to the extent of its Constitutional powers, Plaintiff has paramount rights in; and full dominion and power over, the lands, minerals, and other things underlying the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Louisiana; but denies that Plaintiff ever was or now is the holder of fee simple title to such lands, minerals and other things underlying the Gulf of Mexico within the said limits of the State of Louisiana; and except as herein admitted, denies each and every allegation contained in Article II of the Complaint.

### III.

Admits that the State of Louisiana claims to be and is the holder of fee simple title to the said lands, minerals and other things, subject to the Constitutional powers of Plaintifi and except as herein admitted, denies each and every allegation in Article III of the Complaint.

#### · IV.

Admits that the State of Louisiana claims to be and is the holder of fee simple title to the said lands, minerals, and other things, as above, and has, by general law, authorized the leasing of said lands, but denies that said law and the authority therein conferred were or are adverse to or in conflict with the Constitutional powers of Plaintiff; and, except as herein admitted, denies each and every allegation in Article IV of the Complaint.

### V

Admits that the State of Louisiana claims to be and is the holder of fee simple title to, and pursuant to law, has negotiated and executed leases of lands underlying the Gulf of Mexico within its said limits with various persons and corporations; that wells have been drilled on such lands which are producing petroleum, gas and other hydrocarbon substances; and admits that over a period of many years, since 1812, it has granted leases and licenses for the purpose of removing shells, sand, and other things of value from said lands; that such leases and licenses have been

granted and all operations thereunder have been conducted subject to, consistently with, and with full recognition of the Constitutional powers of Plaintiff, as can and will be proven by competent evidence on the trial hereof; that neither the State of Louisiana nor its lessees have paid to the United States either the value of the petroleum and other things taken from the area or any royalties thereon; and, except as herein admitted, denies each and every allegation in Article V of the Complaint.

#### VI.

Denies the allegations set forth in Article VI of the said Complaint, and shows that, to the contrary, the State of Louisiana claims to be and is the holder of fee simple title to the lands in said area within its said limits, subject to Plaintiff's constitutional powers, as set forth in Article II hereof.

### VII.

Admits that the State of Louisiana claims to be and is, and will continue to claim to be, the holder of fee simple title to the lands in said area with all the incidents thereof, subject to the Constitutional powers of Plaintiff; denies that the State of Louisiana has ever denied or interfered with or is now denying or interfering with any of the Constitutional powers

of Plaintiff over said area; and except as herein admitted, denies each and every allegation contained in Article VII of the Complaint.

### FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The State of Louisiana is the holder of fee simple title to all the lands, minerals and other things underlying all navigable waters within the territorial limits of the State, subject to the Constitutional Powers of the United States in such area, the fee simple title so held by Louisiana having become vested in the State in the following manner:

- (a) Prior to July 4, 1776, the Crown of England had and exercised full territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty in and over, and held fee simple title to, all lands under navigable waters within the territorial limits of the thirteen colonies in America lying on the Atlantic Coast.
- (b) By the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, as confirmed by (1) the Articles of Confederation of July 9, 1778, (2) the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain of 1783 and (3) the Constitution of the United States, the said thirteen colonies in America became separate, free and independent Sovereign States and exercised and do now exercise territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty in and over, and held and

now hold fee simple title to, all lands under navigable waters within their territorial limits.

- (c) By the treaty between the French Republic and the United States concerning the cession of Louisiana, signed at Paris, April 30, 1803, the territory of Louisiana, with all its rights and appurtenances was ceded to the United States, subject to the condition that the ceded territory and the appurtenances thereof be incorporated as a Sovereign State in the Union of the United States and admitted as such as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution.
- (d) By Act of Congress of October 31, 1803, the President of the United States, pursuant to said treaty with the French Republic, was authorized to take possession of and occupy the territory so ceded and was directed to maintain and protect the inhabitants of Louisiana in the free enjoyment of liberty, property and religion.
  - (e) By Act of Congress of March 26, 1804, that portion of the country ceded by France to the United States under the name of Louisiana lying South of the Mississippi Territory and of an East and West line to commence on the Mississippi River at the Thirty-Third Degree of North Latitude and to extend West to the Western boundary of said cession, was constituted a

territory of the United States under the name of Territory of Orleans.

(f) By Act of February 20, 1811, the inhabitants of all that part of the territory ceded under the name of Louisiana by the said treaty made at Paris on April 30, 1803, within the following limits, that is to say:

"Beginning at the mouth of the river Sabine; thence by a line to be drawn along the middle of the said river, including all islands, to the thirty-second degree of north latitude; thence due north to the northernmost part of the thirty-third degree of north latitude; thence along the said parallel of latitude to the river Mississippi; thence down the said river to the river Iberville; and from thence, along the middle of the said river and Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain, to the Gulf of Mexico; thence bounded by the said gulf to the place of beginning, including all islands within three leagues of the coast..."

were authorized to form for themselves a Constitution and State Government in the manner and under the conditions therein mentioned.

(g) Pursuant to said Act of February 20, 1811, the Constitution of Louisiana of 1812 was adopted by the representatives of the people within that part of the territory ceded by the treaty of Paris under the name of Louisiana, with the same boundaries set forth in said Act of Congress of February 20, 1811; and said Constitution of Louisiana, adopted by the repre-

sentatives of the people, was submitted to Congress and approved and ratified by it by Act of April 8, 1812, by which Louisiana was admitted as a Sovereign State into the Union on an equal footing with the original states.

(h) By Act of Congress of April 14, 1812, all that part of the said territory of Louisiana ceded by the French Republic within the following boundaries, to-wit:

"Beginning at the junction of the Iberville with the river Mississippi; thence along the middle of the Iberville, the river Amite, and of the Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the eastern mouth of the Pearl river; thence up the eastern branch of Pearl river to the thirty-first degree of north latitude; thence along the said degree of latitude to the river Mississippi; thence down the said river to the place of beginning..."

became a part of said State of Louisiana, subject to the Constitution and laws thereof in the same manner, and for all intents and purposes as if it had been included within the original boundaries of the said State.

(i) Upon the admission of Louisiana as one of the Sovereign States of the United States by Act of Congress of April 8, 1312, on an equal footing with the original states, the State of Louisiana became vested with and exercised and at all times since said date has exercised, full territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty in and over, and became vested with and held, and at all times since that date has held and now does hold, fee simple title to, all lands under all navigable waters within its territorial limits, all subject to the Constitutional powers of the United States:

## SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

That, acting in conformity with and under its fee simple title and sovereignty and, at all times herein material, since the admission of Louisiana into the Union in 1812, the State of Louisiana has exercised continuous, undisturbed and unchallenged sovereignty over, and has had open, complete, notorious, peaceful, unquestioned, undisturbed and unchallenged possession of all the lands, minerals and other things underlying the Gulf of Mexico within the area described in the Complaint; and that such sovereignty and possession have been and are now being exercised and maintained subject to, consistently with and with full recognition of the Constitutional powers of the United States; and that as a result of the exercise of such sovereignty and possession by the State of Louisiana for more than one hundred years after the admission of the State into the Union in 1812 there has existed the general conviction that Louisiana had and has territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty over and fee

simple title to the said lands, minerals and other things in said area.

WHEREFORE, Defendant demands that this cause be transferred to the law side of this Court and prays for judgment dismissing the Complaint.

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